CCR: Chapter VIII

CHAPTER VIII: Of Man’s Free Will After His Fall

I. What we understand by the name of free will.

Since all men after Adam’s fall and by his fall are conceived in sin, and are born the children of wrath (Eph. 2:3), and prone not unto goodness but exceedingly unto wickedness, this is our belief and confession concerning the free will of a man not regenerate. By the name of free will, we do so mean the free choice of a man, that we do not yet separate from it the faculty of the understanding whereby we judge and determine upon things as what is good and what is ill, or what is to be chosen and what [is] to be refused (Gal. 6:5).

II. That the question is two-fold: one concerning the nature; the other concerning the power of free will.

But we distinguish the question concerning the nature of the whole free will, from the question concerning the nature of man’s choice. Nature we call that natural and essential propriety given of God unto the will or choice, whereby whatsoever it willeth, whether good or ill, the same it willeth freely with mere accord and consent, ever void of all manner of constraint. But by the name of power we understand an ability or force given unto us, whereby we can both discern in the mind what is good and what is ill; and also in the will, to make choice of the one and refuse the other.

III. That free will is always free from constraint.

Even as therefore the substance of free will was not lost by sin (for the understanding and the will, and the whole substance of the mind remained)–so believe we that the nature thereof was not lost, but whatsoever it willeth yet, as well ill as good, that it willeth the same freely, and without all constraint. As Augustine truly said, “free will is always free (namely from constraint) but is not always good.”

IV. Three kinds of things and actions wherein the power of man’s free will is occupied.

But of the power to choose the good or refuse the ill, thus we think: We distinguish good and ill into three kinds–that is, in such things as pertain to the animal life; and in such things as pertain to human life; and in such as pertain to the divine, that is, a Christian life. Of the first kind are such things as are in a manner common unto us with beasts, and do belong unto the vegetable and sensitive faculties. In the second kind are reckoned such things as are proper unto man, and pertain to a human mind, as are all the arts as well mechanical as liberal, the moral and political virtues, [and] lastly, all sciences and all philosophy. And the third kind containeth only those good things and good actions which are ordained only to the kingdom of God and a Christian life, as are the true knowledge of God, faith, and the effects thereof–regeneration, obedience, charity, and other of the same sort.

V. The power in a man not regenerate is very weak in those things which pertain to human life.

To speak nothing therefore of man’s power after his fall, in knowing, in desiring, yea (and if occasion be offered), in choosing and following those things which pertain to the sustaining of this animal life, and the happy leading thereof; and to eschew the contraries because they belong not to religion and to manners–(in which point notwithstanding, daily experience teacheth us how great an infirmity both of judgment and appetite hath taken hold on man)–we believe that although by the mercy of God there is some light remaining in mens’ minds, partly for the judging of what is right and wrong, good and evil in human affairs, and partly for the attaining to the knowledge of diverse things, of arts and instructions, and sundry virtues. Yet that small light what so[ever] it is, is left so little in man’s mind, and his will so depraved, that unless the mind be helped by light from heaven and his will inclined by special grace to choose that which is good, and refuse the ill, men can neither learn the arts truly, and profit by any instructions, nor attain unto any virtues, although there may be in the unregenerate never so many, even as Augustine not without cause did write, that “all the learning or virtues, or rather the images of virtues which were in the Romans and other heathen people, were the singular gifts of God.”

VI. A confirmation of the former opinion.

For neither were, nor are, all the infidels indewed (endowed) equally with the same virtues and knowledge, so that thereby it manifestly appeareth that these were not the gifts of nature, but gifts of God added to nature.

VII. In those things which pertain to God and to true piety, a man not regenerate, can do nothing.

But in things pertaining to God, godliness, religion, and Christian life, we believe that the mind of a man not regenerate is so darkened, and his heart so unsound, and all the powers in him so extinguished, that he can neither know God and the things belonging to God, nor love Him and desire anything acceptable unto Him, much less be obedient to His will as he ought; since the apostle saith [that] the natural man perceiveth not the things that are of God, neither can he know them (1 Cor. 2:14), how should he therefore will and perform? And Christ saith, “without me ye can do nothing” (John 15:5).

VIII. A confirmation of the former opinion.

For as a man being dead unto nature and to men can do none of those things which belong to nature and to man, so neither can he which is dead unto God in sin truly know or do those things which belong unto God or true godliness; but shall altogether consume and putrefy in sin, unless he be delivered out of the same with grace by Christ and be called to life again. For all men without Christ and not regenerate by Christ’s Spirit are quite dead, so as they are said to be truly revived, raised up, and born again, which are delivered from sin by faith in Christ, and do serve Him.

IX. Errors.

We therefore condemn all Pelagians which teach the contrary and do extol the power of free will against the grace of Christ. So do we detest and accurse the Maniches and others which make man to be but as a block which hath no judgment nor any free liberty of will, no not in civil causes.